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Iranians shocked the world in 1979 when they stormed the American 
embassy in Tehran, taking U.S. citizens hostage. These revolutionaries rattled 
the American public's sensibilities: just who were these people, many asked, and 
why do they have a grudge against us? This paper shows that the 1978-79 Iranian 
revolution, so fanatically anti-American in character, sprouted from seeds 
planted in the Iranian consciousness some 25 years earlier. What transpired in 
1978-79 Iran is, according to Barry Rubin, wholly "unintelligible to those who 
know nothing of what occurred in 1953" (12, x). Motivated by self-serving political 
and economic concerns, the 1953 American covert intervention in Iran's internal 
affairs achieved a short-lived Cold War victory while breeding long-term Iranian 
animosity toward the United States. 
American foreign policy became increasingly active in Iran during the 
Anglo-Iranian oil dispute of the early 1950s. Led by Charismatic National Front 
leader and Prime Minister Muhammed Musaddiq, Iranian partisans threatened 
to expropriate all holdings in the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AlOC) if a more equitable profit sharing system was not hammered out. 
Truman Administration policy concentrated on placating the British while 
convincing Musaddiq to compromise (1, 72-4). However, American ambivalence 
soon confused any attempt at impartial mediation. Though hoping to evict the 
British from Iran, the U.S. began to lean toward the British following Musaddiq's 
nationalization of AlOC interests, an action approved by the Iranian parliament, 
the Majlis, in March 1951 (11, 83). U.S. policymakers staunchly refused to cave in 
to Musaddiq's intransigent nationalist demands, ever wary of providing a 
dangerous precedent for other oil-rich nations to follow. It was this overriding 
concern for American oil interests in such places as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela 
that shifted U.S. policy toward a more British hard line (13,117). Nevertheless, 
active American intervention was not feasible at the time. While Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson noted that the maintenance of American influence in the 
Middle East was "far more important ... than it had ever been before," the 
Truman Administration balked at using any U.S. force that was not publicly 
requested by Iran (4, 137; 11, 88). 
However, the American stance in the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute steadily 
and more stridently solidified into an anti-Musaddiq posture. Indeed, the United 
States soon drifted from protector and mediator to exploiter. Because Musaddiq 
nationalized the AIOC, Great Britain and most other Western nations imposed an 
informal boycott on Iranian oil, with quiet and indirect U.S. government support 
(10,22). Following the 1952 presidential election, the new administration of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower began "tightening the noose even further" by rescinding 
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American aid to Iran, an act that Jonathan Kwitny claims "effectively 
underwrote the position of the oil companies" (5, 164). Despite continued U.S. 
pressure, Musaddiq refused to budge. In mid-1952, the cagy Prime Minister 
sought and received dictatorial power from the Majlis (1, 67). His hold on 
domestic power solidified, Musaddiq directly warned President Eisenhower that 
Iran might turn to the Soviet Union for development and military aid if U.S. 
assistance was not forthcoming. While hoping to spark an immediate American 
response, Musaddiq's extortionist strategy actually backfired. Already strongly 
identified with the Iranian communist party, the Tudeh, Musaddiq further 
frightened U.S. policymakers by raising the specter of Soviet influence (10, 38). 
Wary of squandering money on an intransigent nationalist with communist ties, 
American officials were increasingly in search of other options for resolving the 
crisis. 
The United States eventually chose covert intervention to depose Musaddiq 
and shore up the weakened but pro-Western shah for various reasons, all 
intertwined in the minds of American decisionmakers. The most immediate 
reason stemmed from Great Britain's successful campaign for a U.S.-assisted 
interventionist solution to the crisis. While the United States was "still largely 
illiterate in matters Iranian," Britain was a relative expert concerning Iranian 
affairs (1, 84). Most American diplomats had sown their foreign policy oats in the 
Cold War theater of eastern Europe and had concentrated little upon the Middle 
East; even Central Intelligence Agency operative Kermit Roosevelt--one of the 
U.S.'s supposed experts--possessed only a "limited understanding" of Persian 
society (1,88). American policymakers' inexperience thus made the U.S. 
somewhat more susceptible to advice and pressure from their more 
knowledgeable British counterparts, who began pressing strongly for a covert 
solution to the situation after Eisenhower ascended to office (1, 89). 
The U.S. also proceeded with a covert operation because of Prime Minister 
Musaddiq's perceived personality deficiencies and irritating diplomatic 
bullheadedness. Clearly, few Americans like the Iranian nationalist. ~ 
magazine's "Man of the Year" cover story on Musaddiq notes his "grotesque 
antics," calling him "an appalling caricature of a statesman" (7, 18-20). Kermit 
Roosevelt described him as an "ill-tempered, erratic old peasant" (11, 77). Such 
attitudes misperceived the wily, charismatic leader, belying an American 
ignorance of Iranian national politics. One author calls the aged Persian "one of 
the least understood political figures of this century," further noting that the 
United States "distorted and seriously hindered an understanding" of the Iranian 
leader. (1, 54-5). 
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Aside from personality clashes, the United States found Musaddiq 
increasingly intolerable because he refused to compromise with the British. 
President Eisenhower lambasted the septuagenarian for "contemptuously" 
rebuffing American attempts to solve the AlOC crisis (3, 161). Musaddiq's own 
political methodology ultimately proved self-defeating, as his strategy of raising 
the communist threat to gain U.S. assistance backfired. Eisenhower recalled in 
his memoirs that he had no intention of pouring "more American money into a 
country in turmoil in order to bail [Musaddiq] out of troubles rooted in his refusal 
to work out an agreement with the British" (3, 162). The Iranian leader's inability 
to compromise became his fatal flaw, preventing governmental stability that the 
United States so desperately desired. 
The U.S. ardently sought this stability in Iran so that crucial western oil 
interests might be preserved. American'giants like Exxon and Mobil already had 
substantial marketing agreements with AlOX partners, and they stood to lose 
huge profits if an unstable Iranian situation effectively shut them out. Concern 
over western access to Iran's profitable oil industry permeated the mindset of 
State Department diplomats, who maintained constant contact with U.S. oil 
interests throughout the Iranian crisis, even while the Department of Justice 
pursued an antitrust suit against them. This government-big oil connection 
proved especially intimate since both Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his 
brother Allen, the CIA director, previously had worked as well-paid lawyers for 
the major oil companies at New York's Sullivan and Cromwell (5, 163). Sharing 
this concern over western access to Persian oil, Great Britain did not let U.S. 
intervention go unrewarded. Not only was America's share in Iranian oil 
preserved, but the British also allowed the United States to substantially expand 
its oil interests following the coup. In fact, the U.S. soon controlled 40% offoreign 
oil interests in Iran where they had previously held no direct interest at all, 
perhaps suggesting the possibility of a secret deal in the works (1, 80). 
Throughout the crisis, President Eisenhower held firmly to the position that "the 
oil of the Middle East must in no circumstances fall to Communism" (3, 130). By 
daring to threaten much hallowed U.S. property rights, Musaddiq made 
intervention easy for American policymakers to justify. 
Additionally, as Eisenhower's comment suggests, the whole anti-Soviet 
mentality hung like a cloud over all American dealings with Iran. Ray 
Melbourne, head of the American embassy's political section in Iran during this 
time, remembers clearly the Cold War concerns governing the mindset of U.S. 
foreign policy in the 1950s: the perceived 10ss' of China, the unresolved Korean 
quagmire, domestic McCarthy-induced paranoia, the arms race, and the widely­
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held fear of monolithic Communism (8, 346). Indeed, Secretary of State Dulles 
and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson Sounded the alarm in early 1953, fearful 
that "political and economic conditions will continue to deteriorate and that 
important areas, such as Iran, might be lost Communism" (4, 220). President 
Eisenhower agreed that "Iran seemed to be almost ready to fall into Communist 
hands" (3, 1). These concerns led the U.S. to direct more energy toward both 
"overt and covert measures to discredit Soviet prestige ... and to reduce the 
strength of communist parties and other pro-Soviet elements" (4,513). With this 
Cold War mentality alive and well in the minds of U.S. decisionmakers, it is little 
wonder that people like Kermit Roosevelt were preoccupied with the "obvious 
threat of Russian takeover" (11, 11). The United States foreign policy 
establishment grew to despise Musaddiq, and Eisenhower perceived the Prime 
Minister as "8 leader whom the Communists, having gained power, would 
eventually destroy" (3, 163). The arrival ofAnotol Laurentiev, the director of the 
1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, as the new Soviet ambassador to Iran, further 
magnified the fears of communist takeover already pervasive in the American 
Cold War psyche (12,79). The U.S. increasingly felt challenged by the Soviet 
Union's assistance to the Tudeh party, feeling as though the Soviets "were 
flaunting their power ... to intimidate us" (11, 119). 
Although this fear of monolithic communism was quite real, the existence 
of Soviet paranoia allowed the United States to ignore more complex Iranian 
domestic realities. By mislabelling Musaddiq as a communist dupe, Secretary of 
State Dulles and other Cold Warriors were able to ensure the silence of those who 
had questions about big oil's role in shaping U.S. intervention. When the Iranian 
situation was inappropriately painted as a choice between the shah or a 
communist Iran, any dissenters felt forced to hold their tongues for fear of being 
perceived as a communist sympathizer. In describing the meeting where CIA 
intervention was finally authorized, Kermit Roosevelt relates: "I was morally 
certain that almost half of those present, if they had felt free or had the courage to 
speak, would have opposed the undertaking" (11, 19). In fact, some experts 
suggest that the oil companies and Secretary of State Dulles consciously presented 
the crisis as one of communism and containment (l3, 117-8). However, as Rubin 
notes, most of the Eisenhower team typically looked upon nationalist reform 
movements-osuch as Musaddiq's--as "disruptive and as likely to be capture by 
local Communists," a confusion of nationalism and communism quite common 
in U.S. foreign relations during the 1950s (12, 57). Whether intentional or not, the 
explicit association of Prime Minister Musaddiq and his National Front party 
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have posed moral questions about the impending covert operation. 
For these complex reasons, then, continuing Iranian intransigence and 
instability finally prompted the United States to act in 1953, when the Eisenhower 
Administration decided upon cover intervention to depose the Prime Minister. 
Approved by ranking American officials during a June 22 meeting, "Operation 
Ajax" set out to clean up the Iranian situation by calling for the shah to dismiss 
Musaddiq (12, 81). U.S.-orchestrated support was crucial, since the shah's 
similar attempt at removing the Prime Minister a year earlier had proven 
disastrously temporary. Brigadier General Norman Schwarzkopf, arrived for a 
quite visible visit to Iran in March of 1953, bolstering the shah's cOnfidence and 
securing indigenous, high-ranking military support for the impending dismissal 
(11, 147-9; 1, 90). CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt--already named as Operation 
Ajax field commander during a February 3 consultation with British officials-­
made further clandestine contacts with the shah to reassure him of U.S. backing 
(11, 134 & 164). Armed with $100,000 in CIA money, Roosevelt developed an 
affiliation with "the lower-middle-class rent-a-crowd leaders of south Tehran" 
that would later prove useful in beefing up prO-Shah demonstrations (1, 90). 
After the shah fled the city after signing Musaddiq's dismissal into law, 
Roosevelt and other CIA 'employees' helped distribute copies of the decree to a 
confused Iranian public. As word of the Prime Minister's mister spread, the 
streets ofTehran flooded with Tudeh party supporters on August 16 (11, 178-9). 
These mass pro-Musaddiq demonstrations waned three days later, as CIA-hired 
thugs emerged from Tehran's south slums to take control of the streets and assist 
the army in installing the shah's designated replacement for the Prime Minister. 
The shah soon reigned unchallenged, and Musaddiq was arrested and later 
sentenced to three years in prison. When Eisenhower recalled the situation in his 
memoirs, he cryptically understated that the U.S. "did not stop trying to retrieve 
the situation" (3, 164). On August 22, the shah triumphantly returned to Tehran, 
supposedly thanking Kermit Roosevelt with the tribute: "lowe my throne to God, 
my people, my army--and to you" (11, 199). In return, Roosevelt uttered a most 
ludicrous reply, telling the grateful shah that "there is no debt, no obligation" 
owed by him to the United States (11, 201). Roosevelt's dubious assertions aside, 
the U.S. government viewed the operation as a huge containment success. 
President Eisenhower exulted: "For the first time in three years Iran was quiet-­
and still free" (3, 166). 
Both Washington and Tehran emphasized the overwhelming support for 
the shah as self-congratulatory justification for the CIA-induced coup. The shah 
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iseemed to have tapped into a wellspring of domestic sentiment, returning 
stronger and more popular than ever before. The New York Times agreed, 
trumpeting the shah's return with the self-explanatory August 23 headline: 
"Shah, Back in Iran, Wildly Acclaimed; Prestige at Peak" (6, 5). This supports 
Roosevelt's assertion that the more noise the anti-shah demonstrators made, "the 
more the army and the people recognized them as the enemy" (11, 180). The CIA 
operative was not surprised, since his Iranian contacts had continually 
reassured him that the people would choose the shah over Musaddiq (11,93). So 
overwhelming was the shah's indigenous support that one scholar likens the 
overthrow of the Prime Minister to "pushing on an already-opened door" (12, 89). 
Perhaps all the Iranian people needed was a little push to make the 'right' 
decision. 
Just how forceful this 'little push' needed to be is perhaps the most difficult 
aspect of the intervention to discern, even with the benefit of over 30 years of 
hindsight analysis. Certainly, the coup could not have succeeded without 
substantial, willing assistance from the Iranian people. However, the Iranian 
populace "would not or could not have acted without AmericanlBritish direction 
and the psychological support that this involvement carried with it" (1, 93). And 
while support for the shah was indeed widespread, post-Musaddiq Iranian society 
still experienced spasms of dissent. In mid-November, the shah and his 
rejuvenated army "smashed a well-planned major effort" by Tudeh remnants to 
protest his ouster ofMusaddiq (2,2). Tehran later trotted out the security police in 
full force to prevent any demonstrations during Vice President Richard Nixon's 
visit to Iran in early December (9, 3). Despite beginning an immediate purge of 
former Tudeh supporters, the shah still had to contend with substantial Iranian 
ambivalence toward his U.S.-assisted grip on power. 
No such ambivalence characterized the reaction from Washington. Not 
only did covert U.S. intervention extract the troublesome Musaddiq thorn from the 
western world' side, but the CIA operation's success also heralded a welcome 
victory against the forces of communism. Ray Melbourne took great satisfaction 
from his belief that Musaddiq's overthrow was "viewed by the Soviets as a great 
defeat" (8, 358). By establishing a Cold War alliance with Iran, some experts 
think the U.S. realized important gains in both regional politics and the global 
advancement of an anti-Soviet agenda (10, 46). Certainly the U.S. was "almost 
completely able to control the course ofintemal events" in post-coup Iran (14,81). 
As well, the message that the United States stood opposed to nationalism 
apparently took told within the Third World; aside from the Suez Canal, no 
country expropriated any foreign holdings for more than 20 years. The 1953 covert 
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success also provided the U.S. government with what it thought was yet another 
means of implementing American foreign policy, the Central Intelligence 
Agency. By elevating the CIA's status as a foreign policy instrument, the 1953 
Iranian coup provided the impetus for a number of successive (though not 
necessarily successful) covert operations, beginning with Guatemala in 1954 (1, 
93). 
These gains aside, the United States intervention seriously damaged 
foreign relations by forcing the Iranian people to make a decision that they likely 
would not have made on their own. Diplomat Ray Melbourne recalls that the 
people "like the institution of the monarchy, and to them [the shah] was as 
important a figure as Musaddiq. In the public mind of 1953, they were still 
linked" (8, 349). Iranians probably would have like to have kept both leaders of the 
constitutional monarchy. Instead, since the 1953 coup, Kwitny states that the 
Persian people were "forced to live under brutal dictatorships," harsh regimes 
that were closely identified in the Iranian conscience with the meddling United 
States (5, 175). by forcing Iranians to choose the shah over Musaddiq, the United 
States embittered many Iranians and undermined its credibility in the Middle 
East for years to come. 
If one accepts the noble premise that U.S. foreign policy attempts to serve 
the best interests of the American people, then the 1953 covert operation must be 
considered a failure. Though initially creating a pro-American government that 
was beholden to the U.S., this intervention actually served to "protect an oil cartel 
whose interests were not at all synonymous with those of the American people" (5, 
5). The coup actually resulted in higher American gas prices, it directly 
contributed to the climate that eventually allowed the Soviet Union to invade 
Mghanistan (5, 5). More importantly, even as early as 1952, anti-American 
incentive grew because of the carrot-and-stick nature of American aid to the 
shah's government (12, 73). In 1953, the United States firmly planted the seeds of 
discontent that would subsequently mature into a violent eruption of anti­
American hatred (1, 31). Thus, in the final assessment, interference in Iranian 
politics proved to be a long-term disaster. 
While this may have been a short-term victory, one political scientist notes 
that the CIA meddling in Iran "left a running would that bled for twenty-five 
years ..." (1, 86). The 1980 return of exhausted American hostages, repatriated 
after a full 444 days in captivity, engendered painful images that branded 
themselves upon a humiliated and bewildered American conscience. Indeed, the 
effects produces by the 1953 American intervention in Iran eventually 
boomeranged to cause the United States a painful would of its own. 
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